INTRODUCTION
Abraham Robinson, the famous inventor of nonstandard analysis, once asserted that "from the XVII to the XIX century the history of the Philosophy of Mathematics is largely identical with the history of the foundations of the calculus" [Robinson 1966 [Robinson , 2801 Unfortunately, the subject of the foundation of the calculus-especially for the beginning of the 18th century-has been neglected. For example, there is no complete history of the long debate among Leibniz, Hermann, and Nieuwentijt [I] . Even less attention has been given, especially in English-speaking countries, to the debate that occupied the Parisian Academy of Sciences from 1700 to 1706. Previous treatments [Costabel 1965; Fleckenstein 1948; Montucla 1802; Sergescu 1938 Sergescu , 1942 Blay 19861 have in general emphasized specific aspects of the debate and, with the exception of [Blay 19861 , have ignored the foundational aspects of the debate [2] .
The history of the last-mentioned debate is the subject of my paper. This de-bate-which involved savants like Leibniz, Fontenelle, Malebranche, Varignon, Johann (I) Bernoulli, Rolle, l'Hopita1, and a number of other less-known academicians -is important for several reasons. I mention two of these reasons below:
(a) the end of the debate among the academicians decreed the complete victory of the infinitesimal calculus in France;
(b) the attacks by Rolle against the "metaphysics of the calculus" had both philosophical and mathematical significance.
THE SPREAD OF THE DIFFERENTIAL CALCULUS IN FRANCE
In 1696 the Marquis de l'Hopita1 published the first textbook on the differential calculus on the continent: Analyst des injGtime,nt petits pour I'intelligence des lignes courbes. In the eulogy of l'H6pital read in 1704 Fontenelle asserted that until the publication of the Ancrlyse des injniment petits "la Geometric des Infiniment petits n'etoit encore qu'une espece de Mystere, &, pour ainsi-dire, une Science Cabalistique renfermee entre cinq, ou six personnes" [Fontenelle 1704 [Fontenelle , 1311 . Fontenelle was certainly thinking of Leibniz, Newton, the Bernoulli brothers, Varignon, and l'Hopita1.
In 1684 Leibniz published his first memoir on the new calculus, the "Nova methodus . . ." in the Acto Eruditorrfm.
By 1687 the Bernoulli brothers were already in full command of the differential calculus and major parts of the integral calculus, (The geometric version of the fluxional calculus, i.e., the method of prime and last ratios, made its appearance also in 1687 in Newton's Principicr.) Through the teaching of Johann (I) Bernoulli a group of French mathematicians, centered around the charismatic figure Malebranche, came in contact with the new calculus around 1690. This group included l'Hopita1, Varignon, Montmort, Cart-e, Reyneau, and other less famous mathematicians.
In the winter of 1691-1692 Johann (I) Bernoulli initiated the Marquis de l'H8pital in the most remote secrets of the differential and integral calculus. Bernoulli's lectures were instrumental in later enabling I'HGpital to write the Analyse des in$niment petits. This textbook had a remarkable success and for quite a long time represented the only accessible road to the differential calculus.
Various French scholars, Robinet [1960] and Costabel (in [Malebranche 195% 1968 XVII-2] ), have documented the intense activity and collective effort of the group led by Malebranche to come to a full understanding of the new infinitesimal techniques. Malebranche himself had studied the calculus deeply and was, in effect, the main patron of the "infinitesimalist revolution" in the Academy of Sciences. When the academy was renewed in 1699 a number of new places were opened and Malebranche was elected an honorary member. In the following few years the academy came to include a compact group of "infinitesimalists," among them Carre, Saurin, Guisnee, and Montmort. This group was under the technical guidance of l'HBpita1 and Varignon, who were older academicians [4] .
The presence within the academy of a group of mathematicians (including Rolle, Ph. de la Hire, and Galloys), who were decidedly adverse to the new calculus, created an explosive situation [5] . From 1700 to 1706 the academy was divided over the admissibility of the new techniques: on one side stood the infinitesimalist group characterized by its total adherence to the new Leibnizian calculus in the version codified by l'H6pital and in general by a commitment to the existence of infinitesimal quantities; on the other side was the finitist faction characterized by a refusal to give a rigorous status to infinitesimal considerations and by a general adherence to classical techniques.
Since the debate centered on the logical admissibility of the differential calculus given in I'Hopital's textbook, it is important to sketch the structure of the book.
THESTRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSE DES ZNFZNZMENT PETIT3
In the first two definitions I'Hopital characterized the basic primitives of the theory: DBFINITXON I. On appelle quantitks variables celles qui augmentent ou diminuent continuellement ; & au contraire quantitCs constantes celles qui demeurent les mCmes pendant que les autres changent. DEFINITION II. La portion infiniment petite dont une quantite variable augmente ou diminue continuellement, en est appellke la Diffkrence. [I'HBpital 1696, l-2] [6] An an example of the first case consider y = ux2. The parameter a is a constant but the coordinates x and y of the parabola are variable quantities. As an illustration of the second definition l'Hopita1 gave the diagram in Fig. 1 (Figs. l-3 are taken from [l'HGpital 1696, 241) .
Thus, for example, Pp is the differential of AP and Rm the differential of PM and so on. Furthermore the notational convention d is introduced to denote differentials. For example, if AP = x then Pp = dx.
Before I introduce the postulates, I think two remarks are appropriate. Note that Definition I presupposes as a primitive of the theory the notion of a continually increasing or decreasing quantity. A constant quantity is merely a specific case of the latter; it is in fact a variable for which the differential is zero. Moreover, Definition II postulates dx as an infinitely small quantity. But note that 1'Hopital gave a diagram in which dx must always be represented as a finite increment. The pictorial representation left many, as we shall see, in doubt. The postulates of the work were:
On demande qu'on puisse prendre indifferemment l'une pour l'autre deux quantites qui ne different entr'elles que d'une quantite infiniment petite: ou (ce qui est la meme chose) qu'une quantite qui n'est augmentte ou diminute que d'une autre quantite infiniment moindre qu'elle, puisse Ctre consideree comme demeurant la meme. [l'Hopital 1696, 2-31 [7] Thus, Postulate I says that x + dx = x.
II. DEMANDE ou SUPPOSITION.
On demande qu'une ligne courbe puisse etre consideree comme l'assemblage d'une infinite de iignes droites, chacune infiniment petite: ou (ce qui est la meme chose) comme un poligone d'un nombre infini de c&es, chacun infiniment petit, lesquels determinent par les angles qu'ils font entr'eux, la courbure de la ligne. [See Fig. 2.1 [l'Hopital 1696, 31 [8] With respect to the Cartesian tradition, the two postulates of I'Hopital represented a concept-stretching:
he stretched both the notion of equality, considered now as a relation between two quantities that differ by an infinitely small quantity, and the notion of polygon, extended now to encompass curves.
The examples that follow give an idea of the formal manipulations that I'Hopital's postulates allowed. To compute the differential of a product xy 1'Hopital wrote d(xy) = (x + dx)(y + dy) -xy = ydx + xdy + dxdy = ydx + xdy, since by Postulate I it follows that dxdy is of a lower order of magnitude than ydx and xdy . Let us see now how Postulate II is used to compute the length of the subtangent for the parabola. Let ax = y2 be the equation of the parabola (Fig. 3) .
The problem of constructing the tangent is equivalent to the problem of finding the subtangent TP. Given Postulate II, we can set the following proportion: dy : dx = MP : PT. Hence dy : dx = y : PT. It follows that PT = ydxldy. We now use the differential equation for the parabola whose derivation makes use of Axiom 1: adx = 2ydy. This yields dx = 2ydyla. Using the last equality and substituting in the equation for PT, we get PT = 2y2/a, and since y' = ax it follows that PT = 2x, which is the length of the subtangent.
It is important to note here the relationship between 1'Hopital's treatment of tangents and the approaches of Newton and Leibniz. One can think of tangents either dynamically or statically. In the first approach, stressed by Newton, the intuition is to consider the tangent at a point p as a limit of the secants S( p, y) for y approaching p. In the second conception, emphasized by Leibniz, a tangent is not a limiting process but a state, i.e., a position. The tangent to a point, in this second approach, is a straight line that cuts the curve in two points infinitely near or on coincident points. It is clear that the formal means needed to express these intuitions differ. In the first case we deal with a limit of finite ratios. In the second case we need to introduce, as Leibniz did, the notion of differential increment. As the previous example makes clear, I'Hopital's textbook presented the static conception of tangents. Leibniz and Newton had been much more circumspect in their infinitesimal considerations. Also, clearly for strategic purposes, they avoided explicit reference to infinitesimals in their first public expositions of the subject. Leibniz's "Nova methodus . . ." contained no reference to infinitesimals.
The existence of a draft of the "Nova methodus . . ." (never published by Leibniz), in which the calculus is justified by means of infinitesimal considerations, is witness to Leibniz's doubts about the rigor of the infinitesimal approach (see [Horvath 1982, 19861) . Newton, too, had been extremely careful and, in fact, in the Principiu he used the method of prime and last ratios in which no explicit infinitesimal considerations were made. (See [Kitcher 19731 for an analysis of the strategies ofjustification of the calculus in Newton.) There is, however, no doubt that infinitesimal considerations were heuristically the cutting edge of the new tool. With l'H6pital we observe a phenomenon not uncommon in the history of mathematics. L'Hbpital tried to stretch the admissible methods, lifting the heuristics of the infinitesimal calculus to a full rigorous system involving infinitesimals.
By this I mean that l'H8pital's textbook with its axiomatic structure was trying to formalize the intuitive concept of infinitesimal quantities and the operations regulating their use. This was a doubtful move for those who were unwilling to accept infinitesimal considerations as rigorous. The most outspoken adversary of the recognition of the infinitesimal calculus as a subject in rigorous mathematics was the algebraist Michel Rolle (1652-1719), who opened his memoir "Du Nouveau Syst$me de 1'Infini":
On avoit toujours regard6 la GComCtrie comme une Science exacte, & mCme comme la source de l'exactitude qui est rdpandue dans toutes les autres parties des Mathtmatiques. On ne voyoit parmi ses principes que de vtritables axiomes: tous les thCor&mes & tous les problCmes qu'on y proposoit Ctoient ou solidement dCmontr&, ou capables d'une solide demonstration; & s'il s'y glissoit quelques propositions ou fausses ou peu certaines, aussi-t6t on les bannissoit de cette science.
Mais il semble que ce caractere d'exactitude ne regne plus dans la GComCtrie depuis que I'on y a m&Z Je nouveau SystCme des Infiniment petits. Pour moi, je ne vois pas qu'il ait rien produit pour la vCritC, & il me paroit qu'il couvre souvent I'erreur. [Rolle 1703a, 3121 Although published in the proceedings of the Parisian Academy of Sciences for 1703, the memoir represented material used in the early stage of the debate, that is, during I700-1701. We see that Rolle formulated three distinct attacks: the calculus is not rigorous, it leads to mistakes, and it has not produced any new truth. The first two lines of attack were used by Rolle in the first part of the debate that began in July 1700 and lasted until the end of 1701. The last claim was made in a much stronger way in the second part of the debate (1702-1705). The first part of the debate consisted of a fight within the academy between Pierre Varignon and Rolle. Varignon (1654 Varignon ( -1722 , who had been working on applications of the calculus to mechanics, took the task of defending the new calculus. Although several memoirs were produced, the only published outcome of this part of the debate was the later "Du Nouveau Systeme . . ." The other sources available to us (see note 2) are the correspon-dence between Leibniz, Johann (I) Bernoulli, and Varignon (see [Leibniz 1843 -1863 Bernoulli 1988] (a) the differential calculus postulates a hierarchy of arbitrarily large and arbitrarily small orders of infinities (the reader may, carefully, think of them in terms of higher-order differentials); (b) a quantity + or -its differential is made equal to the very same quantity, which is the same as saying that the part is equal to the whole; (c) sometimes the differentials are used as nonzero quantities and sometimes as absolute zeros.
Note that objections (a) and (b) were grounded in the denial of the existence of quantities not satisfying the Archimedean axiom and in the refusal to accept a negation of common notion 5 in Euclid and that in (c) Rolle attacked the manipulations of the infinitesimal calculus because the denotation of the differential was shifted at will during the computation.
For each of the previous points I will expose Rolle's objections and Varignon's answers.
In the arguments for the first objection Rolle made two related claims. The first claim was that (despite 1'Hopital's claims) the infinitesimalists had given no proof of the existence of these various orders of infinities. What bothered Rolle here was 1'Hopital's claim, made in the preface of Analyse des injiniment petits, to be able to give a proof of the existence of infinitesimal quantities by the way of the ancients (i.e., the method of exhaustion). In the paradigm of the period, had the above been carried through, this would have meant a truth-status for statements about infinitesimal quantities and not just the status of an arbitrary mathematical hypothesis.
In his second claim Rolle asserted, apparently without an argument, that talking about differentials was nonsense, because it could be proved that differentials were absolute zeros. In [Rolle 1703a, 3181 he provided an argument by using the equation y2 = ax as an example. Using 1'Hiipital's rules he obtained the differential equality adx = 2ydy. Finally, under the assumption that the point (x + dx, y + dy), lies on the parabola, using the definition of the parabola he obtained ax + adx = y* + 2ydy + dy*. Putting the three equations together and solving the system, using the ordinary algebraic law that subtracting equals from equals yields equals (whose validity Rolle took for granted), he arrived at dy* = 0 and hence dy = 0. Finally substitution of dy = 0 in the equation adx = 2ydy yielded dx = 0. Therefore, Rolle concluded, infinitesimals could not be real quantities. They were in fact absolute zeros. (The example works only if we systematically anchor our interpretation to a domain that has only zero and finite quantities.) Rolle's involved argument can be made clear as follows: under the assumption that the same algebraic manipulations rule finite quantities and infinitesimals, from the equation x + dx = x, one can infer dx = 0. Rolle concluded:
D'abord on y voit que tous ces Infinis du premier genre tels que dx ou dy, n'ayant aucune &endue reelle, tous les Infinis des autres genres ne seroient aussi que des zeros absolus dans le calcul. Toutes ces suites infinies d'Infinis, que fournit le Systeme, ne seroient que des riens qu'on suppose Ctre infiniment compris dans d'autres riens. [Rolle 1703a, 3241 Trying to respond to Rolle's first objection, Varignon provided "proofs" of the existence of infinitesimally small quantities. A representative sample is the following "proof" reported by Reyneau. We can divide an interval of time indefinitely, and so this interval of time can be divided into parts infinitely small, which are called moments. Consider now a body A that moves with constant speed for a time T. The spaces traversed by this body are proportional to the times so that the space described in each moment is to the totality of the space S as an instant t is to 7'. Therefore the space described (on the line) in each instant is a differential.
Rolle's second objection expressed his refusal to identify the whole with the part as in letting x + dx = x. Once again Varignon's answer was an attempt to clarify the nature of infinitesimal quantities. It is interesting that Varignon appealed to Newton's Principia as the source for a rigorous foundation of the calculus. Throughout his answer to Rolle, Varignon quoted verbatim Newton's scholium to Lemma XI in Book I of the Principia. Rolle became confused, said Varignon, because he had not mastered the nature of differentials, which consisted in being variable and not fixed quantities and in decreasing continually until they reached zero, "in fluxu continua." These quantities were considered only in the moment of their evanescence. This was after all, he continued, the same notion as Newton's "fluxiones,"
i.e., "incrementa vel decrementa momentanea." Being considered in the moment of their evanescence they were therefore neither something nor absolute zeros. Reyneau summarized the point in the following way:
Mr. V.
[arignon] explique que quetant euanescentiu diuisibilia, elles [les differentielles] sont toujours reelles et subdivisibles a I'infini jusqu'a ce qu'enfin elles ayent tout a fait cesse d'etre; et c'est la le seul point oh elles se changent en absolument rien. [Reyneau, 147; Bernoulli 1988, 3561 Varignon did not deny that a differential was considered nothing with respect to its integral and he offered a proof of the statement by using the techniques of the ancients (i.e., exhaustion):
Puisque la nature des differentielles [. . .] consiste,a etre infinim' petites et infinim' changeantes jusqu'a zero, a n'etre que quantitates euanescentes, euanescentia diuisibiliu, elles seront toujours plus petites que quelque grandeur donnee que ce soit. En effet quelque difference qu'on puisse assigner entre deux grandeurs qui ne different que d'une differentielle, la variabilite continuelle et indefinie de cette differentielle infinim' petite, et comme B la veille d'estre zero, permettra toujours d'y en trouver une moindre que la difference propode. Ce qui & la maniere des Anciens prouve que non obstant leur differentielle ces deux grandeurs peuvent etre prises pour Cgales entr'elles. [Reyneau, 147; Bernoulli I988, 3571 [IO] This justified, concluded Varignon, the manipulations used in the calculus. Insofar as they were manipulated during the computations the differentials were something on the verge of being zero and only at the end did%ey become zero, in the sense that they were considered in the moments of their evanescence, i.e., "non antequam evanescunt, non postea sed cum evanescunt." This also provided an answer to Rolle's third objection.
Still, it is clear that Varignon's answers were highly unsatisfactory. Thirty years later Bishop Berkeley, with much more wit than Rolle, made fun of the "ghosts of departed quantities. "
It is important to note how Varignon kept quoting Newton as the source for a rigorous presentation of the calculus. He took for granted that the Leibnizian calculus and the Newtonian calculus were equivalent and that Newton's version of the calculus was rigorous. This kind of reasoning can be found later in the century, for example, in [Montucla 1802 III, 110-l 191 . However, none of these assumptions could be easily justified.
Rolle, on the other hand, was defending an approach in which there were no infinitesimals, and he proposed the methods of Fermat and Hudde as everything one needed to solve tangent problems and maxima and minima problems.
Rolle and Varignon were unable to find a common ground on which to resolve their difficulties. Despite the claims of his ability to prove the existence of infinitesimally small quantities by the way of the ancients (the paradigm of rigor), Varignon managed only to give us his inner perception of mathematical reality: a universe made up of variable quantities, dynamic in its essence, where fixed quantities were merely a special case of the former. To the finitist Rolle this was pure nonsense. Only by reducing differentials to zeros could he make sense of Varignon's claims. Rolle's universe was made up of finite quantities and zero; there was no place in it for amphibians.
The stress on the methods of Fermat and Hudde led Rolle to challenge his adversary on very specific mathematical examples. I will sketch the nature of Rolle's claims. Rolle claimed that the differential calculus led to mistakes. His general approach to the problem was to concoct examples of specific curves in which the individuation of maxima and minima carried through with the differential calculus was at odds with the results given by Hudde's rule mistakes in sketching the curves he proposed. Two examples, both of which Reyneau reported, will suffice. On March 12, 1701, Rolle proposed the curve a lj3( y -b) = (x2 -2ax + a* -b2)2'3 . He claimed that the infinitesimal method did not give all the maxima and minima provided by Hudde's rule, and sketched the curve as in Fig. 4 . Hudde's rule in fact gave three ordinates that corresponded to the abscissae a, a -b, a + b, respectively. Rolle had applied the differential calculus by putting dy = 0, and that gave him a maximum at a, but he had not put dx = 0, which is also required for a complete application of the algorithm. Varignon showed that the application of the differential calculus had not been correct and then gave a correct treatment of the curve (whose graph is shown in Fig. 5 ).
On July 2, 170 1, Rolle proposed the curve y = 2 + fix + e. He claimed that by using the differential calculus, one got an imaginary maximum for x = -4, whereas by rationalizing the equation and applying Hudde's rule, one got the maximum at x = 2. The quartic obtained through the elimination of radicals is y4 -8y3 + 16y2 -12xy* + 48yx -64x + 4X' = 0 (Fig. 6 ). The sketch given by Rolle is shown in Fig. 7 . Varignon showed that the point D was only the intersection of two branches of the curve and that the correct application of Hudde's rule would yield both the real value and the imaginary one [12] . Rolle had believed that Hudde's rule provided only maxima and minima without realizing that the rule also gave any point in which the curve has double roots and hence all points of intersections.
These unfortunate examples constructed by Rolle were one of the reasons for Montucla's aversion toward Rolle. It should be noted, though, that Rolle's attacks a-b a a+b had the merit of raising the question of the criteria for individuating maxima and minima as opposed to simple points of intersection. It was only in 1706 that Guisnee proposed a criterion for distinguishing intersection points from maxima and minima [13] . Furthermore, Rolle's objections stimulated reflection on the nature of Hudde's rule, and its relationship to the methods given in the Analyse des injiniment petits, as is witnessed by the several letters that Leibniz and Johann (I) Bernoulli [Leibniz 1843-1863 III, 660-6721 exchanged on the matter and by Guisnee's work.
Let us summarize now how the problem of the foundations was seen by Varignon and Rolle. Varignon tried to show that infinitesimals existed. This belief in the existence of infinitesimals was common to all the French infinitesimalists and they shared it with (and probably got it from) Johann (I) Bernoulli. Their position can be analyzed as an attempt to provide a semantic referent to the forma1 notion of differential. From this point of view Rolle and Varignon were closer than we may think. They both shared the assumption that the foundational problem consisted in making sense of a "realistic ontology." Moreover, we see that both
opponents agreed on the paradigm of rigor: Varignon tried in fact to "prove" his claims by using the technique of exhaustion. Trying to provide a semantic referent for the Leibnizian dx, Varignon made use of Newton and Leibniz at the same time. Although Varignon espoused the Leibnizian formalism he interpreted the differential dx as a process, i.e., the process by which a quantity x became zero (dx represented the instant in which x became zero). But this only shifted the problem one step further. In fact, dx functioned as a numerical constant, and, interpreting it as a process, Varignon's approach created an asymmetry, an incongruity, between the formalism and its referents. (See [Petitot 1977, 4501 for further considerations on this issue.)
THE PUBLIC DEBATE: EXPLAINING AND INTERVENING
Until this point the debate had raged only within the academy. The academy explicitly forbade its members to make public statements concerning this debate despite Varignon's request "d'avoir aussi le public pour Juge" [Bernoulli 1988 [Bernoulli , 2541 . The unwillingness of some members to take a public stand, and perhaps a real concern with the public image of the newly reorganized academy, contributed to this decision. Nonetheless, Varignon had sent the memoirs concerning the debate to Johann (I) Bernoulli and to Leibniz, asking them not to make any public mention of the fight. At the end of 1701 the academy silenced Rolle and Varignon, and the Abbe Bignon, president in 1701, nominated an adjudicatory commission composed of Gouye, Cassini, and Ph. de la Hire to judge the claims made by the contenders. This was the usual procedure in the academy. This commission was very favorable to Rolle (Gouye and Ph. de la Hire were in fact on his side) but it never gave a judgment. Among the reasons for not giving a judgment was that the situation was becoming extremely fluid. People were becoming less hostile to the infinitesimalist position and were slowly changing their attitudes. This was the case, for example, with the Abbe Gouye, who had anonymously attacked the new calculus in an issue of the Journal de Tre'uoux in May 1701. Reviewing an article by Johann (I) Bernoulli, Gouye attacked the analysis of the various orders of infinity and ended his attack by saying: "11 ne suffit pas en Geometric de conclure vray, il faut voir evidemment qu'on le conclut bien" [Gouye 1701,234] . There was no mention in Gouye's article of the ongoing debate within the academy. As an academician, Gouye was compelled to stay silent on that point. Leibniz answered Gouye in the famous letter to M. Pinson written on August 29, 1701, parts of which were published in December by the Journal de TrPuoux. Replying to the attacks of Gouye, Leibniz stated: on n'a pas besoin de prendre l'infini icy B la rigueur, mais seulement comme lors qu'on dit dans 1'Optique que les rayons du soleil viennent d'un point infiniment CloignC, & ainsi sont estimez paralleles. Et quand il y a plusieurs dCgrez d'infini; ou infiniment petit, C'est comme le Globe de la terre est estimC un point h I'Cgard de la distance des fixes, & une boule que nous manions est encore un point en comparaison du semidiametre du Globe de la terre. Desorte que la distance des fixes est un infiniment infini ou infini de l'infini par rapport au diametre de la boule. Car au lieu de l'infini ou de l'infiniment petit, On prend des quantitez aussi gran&s differe du style d'Archimede que dans les expressions qui sont plus directes dans notre methode & plus conformes a I'art d'inventer. [Leibniz 1701 [Leibniz , 270-2711 The claim of being able to recast any proof involving infinitesimals into a proof in the style of Archimedes, i.e., a proof using the method of exhaustion, was extremely suggestive but it was never developed in a completely convincing way. In any case, this last part of Leibniz's letter was ignored by the anti-infinitesimalists who emphasized a literal reading of the first part of the letter.
This declaration by Leibniz did not help the infinitesimalists fighting within the academy at all. If in fact, as Leibniz stated, a differential was to its variable as a pebble of sand to the earth, then it was clear that the differential was still a finite quantity and therefore the calculus could be granted only the status of an approximation method and not that of a rigorous science. That this conclusion was drawn by others is confirmed by the first letter of Varignon to Leibniz (November 28, 1701) . In this letter Varignon, having identified the Abbe Galleys as the sponsor of the anti-infinitesimalist position, asked Leibniz to make a precise statement on what should be understood by "infinitesimal quantity." This was absolutely necessary since: The disciples were asking the master to lead them through the conceptual maze in which they were caught. Leibniz answered Varignon's letter on February 2, 1702. Parts of this letter were published by the Journal des Scauans the same year. The position held by Leibniz in the letter may be summarized in three points:
(a) There is no need to base mathematical analysis on metaphysical assumptions.
(b) We can nonetheless admit infinitesimal quantities, if not as real, as wellfounded fictitious entities, as one does in algebra with square roots of negative numbers. Arguments for this position depended on a form of the metaphysical principle of continuity.
(c) Or, one could organize the proofs so that the error will be always less than any assigned error.
Leibniz ended by pointing out the positive nature of debates in helping sciences acquire better foundations. This had been the case for algebra and geometry, both of which had survived the attacks of their opponents. "J'espere que nostre Science des infinis," Leibniz added, "ne laissera pas de subsister aussi" [Leibniz 1843 -1863 It is important to pause a second to reflect on Leibniz's claims. Leibniz was trying to shift the foundational issue onto other grounds. Leibniz did not think that the calculus was to be justified by its "metaphysics."
Consequently, for Leibniz, the problem is not "Do injinitely small quantities exist?" but "Is the use of infinitely small quantities in the calculus reliable?" [Bos 1980, 871. By this time, the use of square roots of negative numbers in algebra was a wellestablished and accepted practice, although the question of the soundness of its foundations was still largely unresolved. Yet Leibniz in (b) appealed to this accepted practice as a justification for his own. Finally, I should mention the existence of two different foundational approaches that merged in Leibniz's letter. The first was related to the classical methods of proof by exhaustion; the second was based on a metaphysical principle of continuity. (For a detailed analysis of these two foundational efforts see [Bos 1974 [Bos , 1980 Horvath 1982, 19861.) We are interested here in the consequences of this intervention by Leibniz. If we are to trust Varignon's comments in a letter to Johann (1) Bernoulli (see [Leibniz 1843 -1863 ), Leibniz's letter had the welcome effect of answering the Abbe Gouye's doubts. These were important moves within the academy. The debate had not been settled yet and the infinitesimalists needed to modify an atmosphere that was not in their favor. Even if the letter did have this positive outcome, the infinitesimalists were quite unsatisfied with it. Leibniz had not expressed any commitment to infinitesimal quantities and 1'Hopital got to the point of asking Leibniz not to write anything more on the matter. This is how Leibniz, in a letter of 1716, recalled the events: croyoit que par la je trahissois la cause, ils me prierent de n'en rien dire. [ Leibniz 1716, 500] We can conclude, therefore, that the infinitesimalists were deeply dissatisfied with the master. They had looked for a light to follow and they found that Leibniz had no definitive truth to give them concerning infinitesimals.
Signs of this deep disappointment were clearly expressed by Fontenelle in his eulogy of Leibniz read in 1716:
II ne faut pas dissimuler ici une chose assez singuliere. Si M. Leibnitz n'est pas de son c&C aussi-bien que M. Neuton 1'Inventeur du SistCme des Infiniment petits, il s'en faut infiniment peu. II a connu cette infinite d'ordres d'Infiniment petits toujours infiniment plus petits les uns que les autres, & cela dans la rigueur geometrique, & les plus grands Geometres ont adopte cette idee dans toute cette rigueur. II semble cependant qu'il en ait ensuite ete effraye luimeme, & qu'il ait crti que ces differents ordres d'htfiniment petits n'etoient que des grandeurs incnmpnrubles, 8 cause de leur extreme inegalite, comme le seroient un grain de sable & le Globe de la Terre, la Terre & la Sphere qui comprend les Planetes. &c. Or ce ne seroit-la qu'une grande inegalite, mais non pas infinie, telle qu'on l'etablit dans ce Sisteme. Aussi ceux meme qui l'ont pris de lui n'en ont-ils pas pris cet adoucissement, qui gateroit tout. Un Architecte a fait un Batiment si hardi qu'il n'ose lui-m&me y loger, & il se trouve des gens qui se fient plus que lui a sa solidite, qui y logent sans crainte, &, qui plus est, sans accident. Mais peut-Ctre I'adoucissement n'etoit-il qu'une condescendance pour ceux dont I'imagination se seroit revoltee. S'il faut temperer la verite en Geometric, que sera-ce en d'autres matieres? [Fontenelle 1716, 114-l 151 The attacks by Rolle had split the infinitesimalists on the problem of the foundations.
Although it is not my intention to discuss the complex issues related to Leibniz's philosophy of the calculus, I want to consider for a moment the deep difference between Leibniz's position (as perceived by the French) and the French infinitesimalists' position on the problem of foundations. We have seen that the French took very seriously the notion of "different orders of infinity."
In their view this was the foundation of the building. They read Leibniz as insisting on the notion of incomparability.
For Leibniz, they thought, it was enough to claim that a quantity and its differential were incomparable. The French considered this a fatal mistake. If in fact, they argued, two quantities were only incomparable, then their difference was a finite quantity and therefore a finite mistake was introduced in the calculus. This was not the case if dx was an infinitely small quantity. In this case, in fact, the mistake would be less than any finite quantity.
This was a very narrow way to read Leibniz's claims. Leibniz was in fact attempting to define a more subtle position by considering the infinitesimals as well-founded fictions. By reading Leibniz literally rather than metaphorically on the sand and globe metaphor, the French mathematicians were unable to understand Leibniz's more complex position. In effect, Leibniz was proposing a sophisticated "formalistic" foundation for his algorithm. However, by considering the infinitesimals as well-founded fictions, he was introducing a gap between the formal apparatus and the referents. We can say that Leibniz's system was based on a "subversion" of the semantics in favor of a consistent formalism. This could somehow justify his claims that, linguistically, the opposition finite/infinite could be easily relativized.
& il se trouve que les Regles du fini reussissent dans l'infini, comme s'il y avoit des Atomes (c'est-a-dire, des Clemens assignables de la matiere,) quoy qu'il n'y en ait point, la matiere &ant actuellement sous-divisible saris fin; & que vice uersa les Regles de I'infini reussissent dans le fini, comme s'il y avoit des infiniment petits Metaphysiques, quoy qu'on n'en ait point besoin, & que la division de la matiere ne parvienne jamais a des parcelles infiniment petites. C'est parce que tout ce gouverne par raison, & qu'autrement il n'y auroit point de science ny de Regle; ce qui ne seroit point conforme avec la nature du souverain Principe. [Leibniz 1702 [Leibniz , 1861 The Parisian mathematicians tried to provide a concrete reference to Leibniz's formalism. However, at this state of the art, the attempt was hopeless; since finite quantities and infinitesimals were assumed to be ruled by the same algebraic laws, nothing could prevent the inference from x + dx = x to dx = 0. Jakob Bernoulli had earlier warned against the use of the usual algebraic laws, such as "if equals are subtracted from equals, the results are equal," in computations involving infinitesimal quantities. By not addressing the problem explicitly, l'H8pital gave his opponents the opportunity for a strong criticism of the Anafyse des injiniment petits.
ROLLE-SAURIN, 1702-1703: THE SECOND PART OF THE DEBATE
This second part of the debate was fought publicly in the Journal des Sqauans, which had always been very open to the academicians. On April 3, 1702, the Journal des Sqauans published Rolle's article, "Regles et remarques, pour le probleme general des Tangentes." In this article Rolle proposed some new rules for solving tangent problems. The methods given so far, in Rolle's opinion, were insufficient to discover all the tangents to geometric curves. Rolle emphasized that the rules he was proposing had their origin in ordinary analysis (as opposed to the new analysis). The article ended with a challenge clearly addressed to the infinitesimalists. Rolle used various examples showing, he claimed, that when we have more than one tangent at a given point on a curve (corresponding, for example, to a point of self-intersection of the curve), the "most-used" methods were no longer sufficient. One of Rolle's examples was again the curve (A) y4 -8y3 -12xy* + 4&y + 4x2 -64x + 16y2 = 0. Although Rolle never mentioned Varignon or Anulyse des injiniment petits, the article was a clear challenge to the infinitesimalists.
The reply to Rolle was written by a protege of l'Hopita1, Joseph Saurin (1659-1737), who was not yet an academician. He interpreted Rolle's article as a direct attack against the infinitesimal calculus. Rolle had claimed (we are already familiar with his strategy) that in the case of multiple points the new analysis would not give the classical results. It was true that, for example, in (A) dyldx becomes indeterminate for x = 2. Saurin, using I'Hopital's rule, was able to show for some of the cases how the methods given by I'Hopital's book were perfectly fine. He then accused Rolle of plagiarizing I'Hopital's methods by using notational variants of them and attacked Rolle with a purely ad hominem argument: "En lisant cet Article, on sent un Auteur, qui chagrin de ne pouvoir se passer du Calcul differentiel qu'il n'aime pas, t&che de profiter ce qu'il peut y avoir de commun entre ce Calcul & la methode de M. de Fermat pour le confondre entierement avec cette methode" [Saurin 1702, 5311. Finally, Saurin challenged Rolle to apply his methods to mechanical curves. Once again the successful applications of the infinitesimal calculus were playing a major role in its acceptance as a rigorous method.
From this point, the debate became more personal and political. Each faction used any means at its disposal to create the conditions for its victory. For example, the debate went on in the Journal des SCavans, which Gouye and Bignon directed in 1702. Whereas Rolle's article was published without cuts, Bignon had cut Saurin's answer. Here is the bitter comment of Varignon taken from a letter to Johann (I) Bernoulli written in the summer of 1702:
Quant a ce que vous luy [I'Hopital] aviez envoye pour Ctre publit darts le Journal de Scavans. je vous diray qu'on n'y met plus du tout de mathematiques depuis la lettre de M. Leibnitz que j'y fis inserer il y a 5 ou 6 mois. le party etant pris de n'y en plus mettre a moins que ce ne soit dans des Journaux extraordinaires. pour lesquels obtenir il faut avoir de quoy les remplir. outre qu'on ne les accorde encore qu'avec peine a cause du peu de gens qui en achetent.
C'est pour cela que M. le Marquis de L'hopital avec tout son credit a eu touttes les peines du monde a en obtenir un pour publier la Reponse qu'il a fait faire a M. Rolle par un nomme Mr. Saurin; encore M. I'Abbe Bignon (qui a aussi la direction de ce Journal comme Neveu de M. le Chancelier, et qui n'avoit (dit-il) recu I'Ecrit de M. Rolle que parce qu'il n'y paroissoit aucune contestation) a-t-il voulu qu'on en retranchast tout ce qu'il y avoit de personnel: ce qui a tout a fait defigure cette Reponse. [Bernoulli 1988. 3241 We can see therefore that the editorial policy of the favored Rolle over Saurin.
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Rolle attacked again in 1703 and in 1704 (see [Rolle 1703b, 17041) with another memoir on the inverse of tangents (i.e., the integral calculus). Saurin did not immediately answer these attacks but another devoted infinitesimalist decided to join the battle: he was Fontenelle, the perpetual secretary of the academy.
FONTENELLE AND THE EULOGY OF L'H&'ITAL
Fontenelle had been elected perpetual secretary of the academy in 1697. Among his duties was the yearly compilation of the Histoire et MPmoires de I'Acadkmie Royale des Sciences. He also delivered public speeches representing the academy, including the eulogies of the deceased academicians. Since 1694, he had been very close to the group led by Malebranche.
Until this point Fontenelle, although on the side of the infinitesimalists, had publicly spoken of the debate only in a small note published in the Histoire of the academy for the year 1701. One may question the editorial policy of Fontenelle on the subject: his short note did not do justice to a debate that occupied the academy for 2 years-the Registres des Pro&s Verbaux of the academy for 1700 and 1701 are filled almost entirely with these debates (see [Blay 19861 for extensive quotations from the Registres). Still, the note at least gave a hint of the existence of a true problem concerning the foundations of the infinitesimal calculus: "11 saura bien, si la nouvelle Geometric n'est pas solide, se retracter de la grande vogue qu'il commence a lui donner, & y demeler, avec le terns les erreurs qu'il n'y a pas encore appercues" [Fontenelle 1701, 891 . But on the whole the note was very flattering to the new system proposed by l'HBpita1. In particular, 1'Hopital's silence during the debate was carefully explained to avoid the impression that 1'Hopital had any fears concerning his calculus. Fontenelle himself had not yet taken an official stand.
In 1704 the debate was at its peak. On February 2 1'Hopital died, and on April 2 Fontenelle read the "Eloge de M. le Marquis de 1'Hopital."
In this eulogy, the differential calculus was described as the "sublime geometric. " L'HBpital was emphatically described as possessing a map to the "Pays de 1'Infini" and as knowing its most remote paths:
M. de I'Hopital resolut de communiquer saris reserve les tresors caches de la nouvelle Geometric, & il le fit dans le fameux Livre de I'Ann(~w des I~finirnent petits, qu'il publia en 1696. La, furent d&oil& tous les secrets de I'lnfini Geometrique, & de I'lnfini de I'lnfini; en un mot, de tous ces differens ordres d'lnfinis, qui s'elevent les uns au-dessus des autres, & forment I'Edifice le plus Ctonnant & le plus hardi que I'Esprit humain ait jamais ose imaginer. [Fontenelle 1704a [Fontenelle , 1311 Given these words it is difficult to imagine that the very foundations of this building were still under violent attack within the academy. But Fontenelle, addressing the opposition, went even further:
. Aussi cet Ouvrage a-t-il CtC recu avec un applaudissement universel: car I'applaudissement est universel, quand on peut tres-facilment compter dans toute I'Europe les suffrages qui manquent, & il doit toujours en manquer quelques-uns aux chases nouvelles & originales, sur-tout quand elles demandent a Ctre bien entendues. Ceux qui remarquent les Cvenemens de I'Histoire des Sciences, savent avec quelle avidite I'Analyse des Infiniment petits a CtC saisie par tous les Geometres naissans, a qui I'ancienne & la nouvelle methode sont indifferentes, & qui n'ont d'autre interet que celui d'etre instruits. Comme le dessein de I'Auter avoit CtC principalement de faire des Mathematiciens, & de jetter dans les esprits les semences de la haute Geometric, il a eu le plaisir de voir qu'elles y fructifoient tous les jours, & que des Problemes reserves autrefois a ceux qui avoient vieilli dans les Cpines des Mathematiques, devenoient des coups d'essai de jeunes gens. Apparemment la revolution deviendra encore plus grande, & il se seroit trouve avec le temps autant de Disciples qu'il y efit eu de Mathematiciens. [Fontenelle 1704a [Fontenelle , 1331 The opposition's voice was silenced by the universal recognition given to l'H& pital, as if truth were just a matter of universal agreement. The message was all too clear: those who criticized the differential calculus did not understand it. The reference to Rolle and Galloys was very explicit in the comparison made between those who were devoted to the ancients and those who were devoted to learning, regardless of modern or ancient methods. We see how easily Fontenelle skipped over the fundamental issue of the foundations of the new algorithm. This problem had not been settled and Eontenelle knew this all too well. He himself was working on a book that would have provided "la vrai metaphysique" of the infinitesimal calculus.
Nevertheless, the need to destroy the anti-infinitesimalist opposition was too important. No mention was made here of any foundational problem. Reducing the critiques of the noninfinitesimalists to pure ignorance, Fontenelle was taking a very definite stand on the ongoing debate within the academy. To avoid the suspicion that my reading is a superimposition on the text, I quote another source to show that Fontenelle's words had a much clearer and stronger meaning in the context in which they were originally uttered:
Mr. I'Abbe Bignon en donnant a Mr. de Fontenelle les loiianges qu'il meritoit pour les deux beaux discours qu'il venoit de prononcer, luy dit qu'il avoit fait si hautement I'eloge de la Geometrie des infiniments petits. qu'apres ceia on ne pouvoit douter qu'il n'en Mt le partisan declare. Que cependant ceux qui n'etoient point initiez dans les mysteres de cette nouvelle Geometrie Ctoient effrayez d'entendre qu'il y cut des infinis, des infinis d'infinis & des infinis plus grands ou plus petits que d'autres infinis; parce qu'ils ne voyent que le comble de I'edifice saris scavoir sur quel fondement il Ctoit appuye. II exhorta done Mr. de Fontenelle qui travaille a des Elemens du calcul differentiel de les donner au phitot au public, afin de convaincre tout le monde de la solidite de cette sublime Geometrie a qui il venoit de donner tant d'eloges. [Journal de Trhwx 1704 , 1016 It is clear that the eulogy of I'Hopital was perceived as an open declaration of partisanship on Fontenelle's part. Not only did he use his lofty position to make public statements concerning the truth or falsity of the anti-infinitesimalists' claims -a practice that one may clearly question-he went further. The first page of the Histoke et MPmoires de I'Acadkmie des Sciences for 1704 had the following ' 'Avertissement":
On a imprime dans les Memoires de 1703, page 312, un Ecrit de M. Rolle, intitule, Du nouveau Systeme de I'lnfini. Les Reflexions que diverses personnes ont faites sur cet Ecrit, sur les principes qui y sont avances, & sur le consequences qu'on en pourroit tirer, obligent a declarer que quoqu'il se trouve parmi les autres Ouvrages destines a I'impression par I'Academie, son intention n'a jamais CtC d'adopter rien de ce qui s'y peut trouver. [Fontenelle 1704b] This official condemnation of Rolle's memoir, a flagrant contradiction of the spirit of the academy, raised several doubts concerning the alleged impartiality of this institution.
For us the condemnation is important because it showed that Fontenelle (and Bignon) had already made a decision on the debate. This sheds light on the composition of the two groups and, as we shall see, on the composi-' tion of the adjudicatory commission nominated in 1705. It is clear that the fight was far from being decided. The academy made its decision public in January 1706. Rolle was asked to conform better to the regulations of the academy and Saurin was "renvoye a son bon coeur." Fontenelle referred in 1719 to this decision as the "paix des infiniment petits." Leibniz and Johann (I) Bernoulli were of course dissatisfied; Leibniz considered the judgment "magis morale quam mathematicum"
[Leibniz 1843-1863 III, 7941. But it is clear that given the composition of forces within the academy no other verdict would have been possible.
The judgment stopped Rolle's attacks, and the death of Galloys in 1707 put an end to the opposition. Varignon wrote to Johann (I) Bernoulli (November 10, 1706):
J'ecris a M. Hermann que M. Rolle est enfin converti: il vous dira comment il m'est l'est venu a marquer et a M. de Fontenelle; il I'a aussi marque au P. Malebranche, disant qu'on I'avoit pousse a faire ce qu'il a fait contre les infiniment petits, et qu'il en etoit fache. . . . [Malebranche 1958 -1968 We can speculate about Rolle's change. He had alienated himself from the rest of the mathematical community. He probably thought it best to excuse himself and accept a dignified peace. I cannot help but quote Leibniz's comment regarding Rolle's alleged conversion: "Plus gaudii est in coelo nostro geometric0 ex uno peccatore converse, quam ex decem justis" [Leibniz 1843 -1863 . What is certain, however, is that Rolle never did convince himself of the soundness of the infinitesimal calculus. Writing to Leibniz in 1708, Varignon mentioned that Rolle was still making adverse comments: "J'apprend cependant que M. Rolle ne laisse pas de decrier encore sourdament ce calcul par le monde" [Leibniz 1843 -1863 IV, 1671 .
The death of Galloys and the withdrawal of Rolle marked the final victory of the infinitesimal calculus on the continent. In his preface to the bmens de la ge'ome'-trie de l'infini Fontenelle could finally boast: "Malgre tout cela 1'Infini a triomphe, & s'est empare de toutes les hautes speculations des Geometres. Les Infinis ou Infiniment petits de tous les ordres sont aujourd'hui egalement etablis, il n'y a pas plus deux partis dans 1'Academie" [Fontenelle 1727, preface] . The battle had not been an easy one. CONCLUSION I made two claims in my introduction.
It is now time to comment on them. (a) There is no doubt that the withdrawal of Rolle and the death of Galloys marked the complete victory of the infinitesimal calculus in France, a victory sought with constant appeal to the authority of the most famous geometers and to the increasing success of the differential algorithm in solving problems inaccessible to the previous algebraic techniques. We must be amazed at the effort spent by the infinitesimalists on winning their battle. The foundational issue remained unclear but the analysts pushed ahead, as Kline would say, "with vigor but without rigor. ' ' (b) My second claim concerned the philosophical and mathematical significance of Rolle's objections. As to the mathematical significance, although flawed by several mistakes Rolle's attacks had the merit of pushing research toward areas not yet completely understood: witness the work by Saurin in the next 2 decades on singularities on curves and Guisnee's work on Hudde's and Fermat's rules. As to the philosophical significance, the opposition finite/infinite is one of the longstanding issues in the philosophy of mathematics. Rolle addressed the problems of rigor in mathematics and of the acceptability of infinitary mathematics. This forced the infinitesimalists to address explicitly the foundational problem, and, as we have seen, they were far from having conclusive answers.
Rolle's criticisms also foreshadowed Bishop Berkeley's more famous attacks against the fluxional and the differential calculus. Several questions could be asked about the relationship between the early criticisms of the infinitesimal calculus (of Rolle, Nieuwentijt, Cluver, etc.) and the successive ones. For the moment I will limit myself to some brief remarks about the similarities and dissimilarities between Rolle's criticisms and Berkeley's Analyst while referring the reader to [Blay 19861 for a more thorough analysis. It is quite interesting to find that Rolle's three main objections are raised in the Analyst. In particular, Berkeley's paragraphs 6 and 7 contain a critique of the existence and conceivability of differentials, and paragraph 18 contains an attack on the use of dx both as a quantity and as an absolute zero. Although the motivations for Rolle's attacks and Berkeley's criticisms differed, the two agreed on a number of points and on an explicit finitism. For Rolle this finitism was embedded in the Cartesian refusal to admit infinitary mathematics as a rigorous discipline; for Berkeley, more explicit epistemological considerations accounted for the finitist commitment.
I must also remark on the different logic in the strategies employed by Rolle and Berkeley. Rolle thought that the wrong principles of the analysis were bound to produce falsities; Berkeley never questioned the results of the calculus and proposed his theory of double mistakes to explain how one could, through several errors, arrive "though not at science yet at truth" [Berkeley 1734, 781. Finally, it is my opinion that Rolle's position within the academy made his attacks much more dangerous for the French infinitesimalists than Berkeley's attacks were for the British mathematicians.
Moreover, Rolle's challenge was extremely radical, as Fontenelle points out: "il y a certainement encore des difficult& a eclaircir dans le Systeme de la nouvelle Geometrie; mais on parloit de renverser le Systeme total" [Fontenelle 1719, 981. Rolle provoked inside the academy a foundational "crisis''-according to Herbert Mehrtens's definition, a "phenomenon
[whereby] in a given mathematical communityfor whatever reasons -the common commitment of the groups are questioned and, consequently, the stability of this social system is at risk" [Mehrtens 1976,303] . The means to solve this crisis ranged from clarifications to authority, from persuasion to proof, from dubious editorial policies to public condemnations.
Once again we must reach the conclusion that mathematics and its development are due to human efforts and not only to the soundness of the ideas involved.
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NOTES
1. For some recent work in this direction see [Giorello 1985, chap. vii] . Peiffer of the manuscript [Reyneau] . Although I had used the original manuscript, I have subsequently changed the quotes from [Reyneau] to conform to [Bernoulli 19881 . In addition, the quotes from [Fedel I9321 have been changed to [Bernoulli 19881 . In the introduction to Reyneau's text, Peiffer also refers to the article [Blay 19861 , which had escaped my attention, in which the foundational aspect of the Rolle-Varignon debate is emphasized. By comparing Rolle's and Berkeley's critiques, Blay shows that the technical success of the differential calculus in the first 3 decades of the 18th century brought a change in the "style of criticisms" leveled against the differential calculus. Since Blay uses material from the Rolle-Varignon debate, there is some overlap between Section 4 of this paper and the first half of Blay's article. Blay's insightful article must be recommended for the extensive use of the Registres des Pro&s Verbaux des Seances de I'AcadCmie Royale des Sciences (in particular, vols. I9 and 20) , where one can find the second, third, and fifth memoirs by Rolle and the first four replies by Varignon. The archival sources used by Blay enrich but do not alter the general picture of the RolleVarignon debate as conveyed by Reyneau. Thus, I have not found it necessary to modify Section 4, although I refer the reader to Blay's paper where appropriate.
3. In this paper all quotations appear in their original form; no attempt has been made the spelling or to resolve many of the inconsistencies in spelling of the original text.
to modernize 4. The reader branchists." is referred to [Malebranche 1958 -1968 for detailed biographies of the "male-5. Rolle was an algebraist, Galloys ( I632-1707) had done some work de la Hire ( 1640-I7 18) had done important work on conic sections. on ancient geometry, and Ph. 7. "POSTU LATE 1. Grant that two quantities, whose differences is an infinitely small quantity, may be taken (or used) indifferently for each other: or (which is the same thing) that a quantity, which is and quantity is continually in-
